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P A U L I N E K L E I N G E L D
FROM THE FIRST SENTENCE of the Critique of Pure Reason through the writings of
the late 17905, Kant describes human reason as striving for the unconditioned
and as having needs and interests.' I refer to this as Kant's characterization of
reason as "conative." Although several authors have aptly described this char-
acterization of reason,2 few have reflected on the problems it raises. These
'References to the Critique of Purr Reason are to the pages of the first (A) and second (B)
editions. All other page references are to Kants Gesammelte Schriften, edited under the auspices of
the Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-
AH translations are my own.
Abbreviations used:
ApH — Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht [Anthropology}
CMS = Grundlegung zur Mttapkysik derSitten [Groundwork]
KrV = Krittk der reinen Vemunft [Critique of Pure Reason]
KpV = Kritik der praktiscken Vemunft [Critique of Practical Reason]
KU = Kritik der Urteilskraft [Critique of Judgment]
Logik = Immanufl Kants Logik. Ein Handbuch LU Vorlesungen [Logic]
MdS = Metaphysih der Silten [Metaphysics of Morals]
Prol = Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen Metaphysik, die ais Wissenschaft wird auftreten konnen
[Prolegomena]
Rel = Religion inncrhalb der Grenzen der blojîen Vernunft [Religion]
RezHer = "Rezensionen von Johann Gottfried Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit" [Herder Reviews]
TPP = "Über den Gebrauch tel e o logischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie" ["On the Use of
Teleological Principles in Philosophy"]
VvT ~ "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" ["On a
Dignified Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy"]
WhDo = "Was heiBt: Sich im Denken orientieren?" ("What Is Orientation in Thinking?"]
ZeF = "Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf" ["Perpetual Peace"]
"Daniel Breazeale, "Kant, Fichte, and the 'Interests of Reason1," Daimon g (1994): 81-98;
Amihud Gilead, "Restless and Impelling Reason: On the Architectonic of Human Reason accord-
ing to Kant," Idealistic Studies 15 (1985): 137-50; Jürgen Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse
(Frankfurl/M: Suhrkamp, 1973), 235-62; Susan Neiman, The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant
{Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Heinrich M. Schmidinger, Dos Problem des Interesses und
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problems are more complicated than is generally assumed. Given the oddity
of personifying reason as having needs and interests, one might be inclined to
read these notions as merely decorative metaphors, and indeed this is how
they are usually taken.
But metaphors for what exactly? Here Kant seems to get into difficulties. If
he intends these notions to play a merely ornamental role,s he cannot be justi-
fied in using them—as he does—to defend assumptions of pure reason, such as
the practical postulates. Alternatively, if by "needs of reason" he means no more
than "needs of humans,"4 he cannot legitimately claim—as he does—that such
needs apply to all finite rational beings. Although the conative terms play a
crucial role in several of Kant's arguments, he nowhere explains this usage. In
this essay, I examine the problems raised by Kant's characterization of reason as
conative and propose an interpretative solution.
The structure of this article is as follows. I first introduce Kant's talk of the
needs and interests of reason and give two examples of arguments in which it
plays a decisive role. I then discuss four different interpretations. Having
identified a number of problems with literal interpretations of the conative
characterization of reason, I further examine whether a metaphorical read-
ing, suggested by several authors, can solve these problems. I argue that it is
impossible to regard the conative terms in which Kant describes reason as
merely decorative metaphors, but that they are better understood as cases of
"symbolic exhibition" in Kant's own sense.
1 . R E A S O N AND THE "RIGHT OF N E E D "
Kant assumes the meaning of the term 'need' (Bedürfnis) to be familiar and
uses it in the ordinary sense of a deficiency of something necessary or desired.
If the subject of the need is conscious of the deficiency, it is thought to desire
whatever is expected to fulfill the need, and to aim at this fulfillment. If this
striving is successful, a feeling of satisfaction on the part of the subject will
die Philosophie Sô'ren Kierkegaard* (Freiburg: Alber, 1983), 84-117; Manfred Sommer, Die Selbsler-
haltungdcr Vernunft (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1977); Yirmiyahu Yovel, "The Interests of
Reason: From Metaphysics to Moral History," in Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, ed.
Yirmiyahu Yovel {Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 135-48; John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's
"Critique of Judgment" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 169-77, 312-16. The most
detailed discussion to date—Manfred Pascher's Kanis Begriff'Vernunftinteresse' (Innsbruck: Insti-
tut fur Sprachwissenschaften, 1991)—is focussed exclusively on the notion of "interests" of rea-
son. Pascher does not discuss related terms, and although he shows very carefully where reason's
interest plays a role in Kant's argument, he does not problernatize the nou'on as such.
3 Sommer, Die Selbsterhaltung der Vemunft, 233, n.2g; Yirmiyahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy
of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 16, 105; Yovel, "The Interests of Reason,"
'37f-
«Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 165!".
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follow. 'Interest' is closely related to 'need', although the two terms are not
identical in meaning. If one consciously has a certain need, one takes an interest
in that which is expected to contribute to its satisfaction. According to Kant's
definition, 'interest' is the feeling of delight (Wohlgefallen) connected with the
representation of the existence of a certain object or action, which can thus
become a determining factor of our will, namely, to bring about this object or
action (cf. KU V, 204, 207). "[T]o will something, and to take a delight in its
[conceived] existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical" (KU V, 209).5
Finite rational beings always aim at the satisfaction of their needs, and this
satisfaction always depends on the existence of what is needed (cf. KpV V,
137). Significantly, the concepts 'need' and 'interest' are applicable only to
finite beings: for an infinite being, Kant claims, wanting something and the
existence of the wanted object would coincide (cf. CMS IV, 4i3,n.).
Whereas Kant's use of these terms is most often discussed in relation to
inclination, I concentrate here on Kant's attribution of needs and related
characteristics to human reason. At the very beginning of the Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant introduces reason's striving character. In the oft-quoted opening
sentence of the first preface to the first Critique, he speaks of the "peculiar
fate" of reason, that "it is burdened by questions which it cannot dismiss,
because they have been prescribed by the nature of reason itself, but which it
is unable to answer, because they transcend all powers of human reason"
(KrV, A vii). These questions, according to Kant, regard the unconditioned.
Reason "demands" to find the unconditioned condition for everything condi-
tioned (KrV, B xx; A 324/6380). Because the unconditioned cannot be found
within the limits of possible experience, however, reason's "inextinguishable
desire" (KrV, A 796/6824) leads it to transcend these limits. Reason is "driven
by its own need" (KrV, 821).
Kant claims that reason has both a speculative and a practical interest. Its
speculative interest consists in "knowledge of objects up to the highest princi-
ples a priori," and its practical interests in the "determination of the urillmth
regard to its ultimate and complete end" (KpV V, izo).6 This duality may
seem to threaten the ultimate unity of reason—thereby contradicting another
"unavoidable need of human reason," namely, "insight into the unity of the
entire pure faculty of reason (the theoretical as well as the practical) " (KpV V,
91). Although such insight is ultimately unavailable,' Kant stresses that there
sSee also the definitions of 'interest' in CMS IV, 4i3n.; KpV V, 119; KU V, 204, 207, 209;
and MdS VI, 211. The fact that Kant repeatedly defines 'interest' (unlike 'need') may be explained
by the novelty of the concept in the philosophical vocabulary of the time.
«See also KrV A 462-76/8490-504; A 8o4f./B 8s2f.; WhDo VIII 139.
'Dieter Henrich stresses the in-principle unavailability of such insight in "On the Unity of
Subjectivity" in his Th* Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy, ed. Richard L. Velkley, and
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is no conflict between theoretical and practical reason, and that the interests of
practical reason have primacy over those of theoretical reason (KpV V, l ig).8
Kant's sparse remarks do not make it easy to see what the grounds for this
primacy are, but one may assume they lie in the fact that the moral determina-
tion of the will is unconditionally required, whereas theoretical knowledge is
not. Furthermore, as shall be shown below, reason's practical interest is able to
satisfy the demand for the unconditioned to a much higher degree than is
possible for theoretical reason.
Reason's quest for the unconditioned is a recurring narrative theme in the
Critique of Pure Reason. Kant's vivid descriptions are well-known: reason tries
to get a hold of the supersensible, but initially chooses the wrong strategy,
thinking it can do so via theoretical-speculative means. The Critique reveals
this to be an illusion, but also shows that reason can eventually find its satisfac-
tion in pure practical faith.» Kant then concludes by stating that the impossibil-
ity of knowledge of the supersensible is actually quite proper given our moral
situation, and that it can be viewed as the wise design of Providence.10 Be-
tween the beginning and the end of the first Critique, reason's "peculiar fate"
receives meaning and is reconceived, within the context of Kant's moral phi-
losophy, as Providential design. In his other works, too, there are frequent
links to this narrative theme."
It might seem as if this theme of reason's quest for the unconditioned, and
with it the idea of reason as having needs and interests, function only as rhetori-
cal devices on Kant's part to add some drama to his otherwise all-too-prosaic
philosophical treatises. Such an interpretation of the function of the conative
character of reason would be unlikely to encourage the (nondeconstructivist)
reader to analyze it further in philosophical terms.
Reason's conative character does, however, play a decisive role in several of
Kant's arguments. I here focus on only two arguments in which it fulfills a
justificatory function: Kant claims that reason's speculative interest justifies
the regulative use of the idea of God (KrV), and that its practical interest
justifies the postulates of God's existence and the immortality of the soul
(KpV).
The decisive principle underlying these arguments is the concept of a right
trans. Jeffrey Edwards, Louis Hunt, Manfred Kuehn, Guenter Zoeller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994), 17-54.
8See Daniel Breazeale's insightful discussion of this issue in "Kant, Fichte and 'The Interests
of Reason'," 86-88.
»Cf. KrV, A 462ff./B 4goff; A sSjf/B 61 if.; A 795f./B Sajf.; A 797ff./B Szjff.; A 8o4ff./B
83211.
'»KrV A 801/6829; cf. KpV V, 148.
"Cf. Prol IV, 362; WhDo VIII, i36ff.; TPP VIII, isgff.; KpV V, 5 and I46ff.
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of need (Recht des Bedürfnisses), which he introduces in "What Is Orientation in
Thinking?" Kant's basic idea in speaking of a right of need is that, whenever
an objective decision is impossible in a matter of interest to reason, it is legiti-
mate for reason to orient itself on the basis of its own needs.12 Reason has this
right only when it is impossible to prove either the existence of something or its
nonexistence, and where assuming one or the other does not involve a contra-
diction. If one or the other satisfies a need of reason, reason has a right to this
assumption (cf. MdS VI, 354), i.e., the assumption is justified. Kant speaks of
the right of need of reason . . . as a subjective ground to presuppose and assume some-
thing which it is not allowed to presume to know on objective grounds; and conse-
quently, [the right] to orient itself in thinking—in the immeasurable space of the su-
persensible, which for us is filled with opaque night—merely by means of its own need.
(WhDoVIII, 137)
Against the impression that this thesis provides carte blanche to regard any
assumption about unknowables as rationally justified, Kant stresses that the
right of need takes effect only in the case of needs of reason and neither in that
of needs of inclination nor in that of mere wishes and phantasies. Hence he
dismisses the objection raised by Thomas Wizenmann that the concept of a
right of need would entitle a person who had fallen in love with a self-created
idea of beauty to conclude that a corresponding object really exists (KpV V,
i43f.,n.).
Kant uses the concept of a right of need explicitly only in his essay "What Is
Orientation in Thinking?" but it is implicit in a number of arguments. In the
next section, I provide two examples in which Kant appeals to the needs of
speculative and practical reason, respectively. It is not my intent to determine
the ultimate soundness of Kant's arguments here. Rather, I only wish to show
that the concept of a need or interest of reason plays an important role in
Kant's work and how it does so, in order to set the stage for the critical
discussion in the rest of this essay.
2. TWO E X A M P L E S
i. The first example concerns needs and interests of speculative reason. Part
of what Kant aims to show in the Critique of Pure Reason is that theoretical, or
better (since it here transcends the limits of possible experience) speculative
reason, cannot gain knowledge of the supersensible. That is not to say, how-
ever, that speculative reason does not have an important contribution to
make. It would be a mistake to think that the Dialectic of the first Critique has
l sBy using the term 'right', Kant locates the concept within the juridical discourse with which
he describes his philosophical program of a critique of reason, as the tribunal before which the
claims of traditional metaphysics are to be judged.
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only a negative role. In positive terms, Kant wants to show that speculative
reason has an indispensable systematizing function.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic Kant does not discuss the
possibility of forming general empirical concepts and finding empirical laws,
and of forming a system (i.e., a coherent whole that is organized by one princi-
ple) of such empirical concepts and laws. In principle, the world could be so
complex that it would be impossible for humans to discover any regularities or
similarities, let alone construct a systematic unity of empirical concepts and
laws. Whether or not this is the case cannot be established a priori. But, Kant
claims in the Transcendental Dialectic, especially in its Appendices, reason's
need for systematic unity of knowledge leads one out of this theoretical un-
decidedness, for it justifies the use of the idea of a systematic unity as regulative
principle. It is Kant's conviction that any systematic unity has to have a rational
origin, and this is how reason's need for unity comes to justify the use of the
regulative idea of God, where God is primarily understood as highest
intelligence.
Kant justifies the use of this regulative principle in terms of the conative
nature of reason and by invoking the justificatory concept of a right of need:
The highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the purposive unity
of things, and the speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard all order in
the world as if il had originated in the intention of a supreme reason. (KrV, A686f./
B7i4f.)'s
He says that reason's "speculative interest, and not its insight, justifies it in
starting from a point which lies so far above its sphere" (A 676/8 704). The use
of the regulative idea of God is permitted, insofar as and because it helps
reason to satisfy its need for unity (A 673ff./B 7oiff.). In this way, it is possible
to give "to reason the most perfect satisfaction with respect to the highest unity
in its empirical employment, which it must seek" (A 676/8 704; emphasis mine).
Although Kant ascribes a necessary role to the idea of God, he simulta-
neously stresses the limited scope of this role. For since an idea of God suffices
for purposes of systematization, there is no need to assume the existence of an
object that corresponds to the idea and thus no justification for doing so (cf. A
676f./B 704^). We shall see below that Kant claims that the need of practical
reason is stronger in this respect and that it has a concomitant right to farther-
reaching assumptions.1'!
'3 Kant goes on to justify the use of ideological judgments, but since my aim here is simply lo
give an example of how the notion of needs of reason plays a justificatory role, I shall not consider
that here.
'«The example given here concerns only the idea of God, but Kant defends the use of the
other regulative ideas in a similar fashion. See A 673-75/6 701-703.
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2. The second example concerns needs and interests of practical reason.
Kant says in the second Critique that practical reason seeks the unconditioned
totality of the object of pure practical reason, which he terms the "highest
good" and which he conceives of as the unity of virtue and happiness (KpV
V, 108). It is a duty, i.e., it is "objectively practically necessary," to promote the
highest good. In acknowledging this as a duty, one necessarily presupposes its
possibility. This presupposition is necessary, since it is "practically impossible
to strive for the object of a concept which is in principle empty and without
object" (KpV V, 143).
Once this primary presupposition has been established, the concept of a
need of practical reason is introduced. Kant claims it is a need of pure practical
reason to presuppose not only the possibility of the highest good but also to
spell out the conditions of this possibility and to assume the existence of these
conditions (KpVV, i42ff.). According to Kant, these conditions of the possibil-
ity of the highest good are the immortality of the soul and the existence of
God. '5 In the section entitled "Of Holding-to-be-True out of a Need of Pure
Reason" (Vom Fürwahrhalten aus einem Bedürfnisse der reinen Vernunft)
(KpV V, 142-146), Kant argues that reason's need "justifies" (KpV V, I44n.)
assuming the existence of these conditions, i.e., entitles us to assume the actual
existence of God and the immortality of the soul. So, he claims, it is "subjec-
tively" impossible—that is, "reason finds it impossible for itself (KpVV, 145)—
to conceive of the possibility of the highest good without immortality and God,
even though it cannot be proven that the highest good is impossible without
them. But because it is possible neither to prove nor to disprove the existence
of God and the immortality of the soul, here reason's interest is allowed to
decide (KpV V, 146). Reason thus has a "choice" (KpV V, 145) and its need is
the subjective principle that determines this choice:
the principle that determines our judgment in this regard, though as a need it is
subjective, yet at the same time being the means of promoting what is objectively (practi-
cally) necessary, is the foundation of a maxim of holding something to be true [Maxime
des Fûrwahrhaltens] from a moral point of view. (KpV V, 146)
Thus, for Kant, in addition to the preliminary requirement that they do
not involve a contradiction, the practical postulates of the immortality of the
soul and the existence of God are justified by the fact that they satisfy a need
'sFor present purposes, my discussion of this example is concentrated solely on the role of
the "needs of reason." I discuss neither the issue of whether Kant is right in saying that promoting
the highest good is a moral command, nor issues concerning the contents of the two components
of the highest good, nor Kant's motivation of the necessity of these two postulates. I discuss these
issues in my "What Do the Virtuous Hope For? Re-reading Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good,"
in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, ed. Hoke Robinson (Milwau-
kee: Marquette University Press, 1995), Vol. 1.1,91-112.
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of pure practical reason. Thus, practical reason is entitled to make stronger
assumptions than speculative reason, for the latter could legitimate only the
use of regulative ideas, and not the assumption of the existence of objects corre-
sponding to them.
It should now be clear that Kant uses the notion of the "right of need" at
crucial points of his arguments. I will not discuss the cogency of these individ-
ual arguments, but focus on the more fundamental question of how to inter-
pret the conative character of reason. I begin by investigating the possibility of
a literal interpretation of Kant's account, and then go on to examine two types
of metaphorical interpretation.
3. TWO TYPES OF L I T E R A L I N T E R P R E T A T I O N
There are a few passages in which Kant asserts that reason feels needs.'6 Now
feeling can have many causes, causes that can lie in reason itself (as with, e.g.,
moral feeling) as well as in inclination. But whatever the cause of a feeling,
Kant is clear that feeling qua feeling is sensuous (sinnlich) (cf. KpV V, 75). As he
states in the Metaphysics of Morals, "feeling, whatever it may be caused by, is
always physical" (MdS VI, 377).'' But if feeling is defined as sensuous and
physical, then reason cannot consistently be said to feel. Thus, if one were to
give a literal reading to the passages in which Kant claims that reason "feels,"
he would here be confounding his own distinction between reason and feel-
ing. I see no way to avoid this conclusion.
Importantly, it is not just the explicit claim that reason has feeling that
generates problems here. In fact, as we saw at the beginning of this essay, the
whole cluster of terms that Kant uses to describe the nature of reason—
including 'to aim', 'to strive', 'to want', 'to have an end', 'to have an interest',
and 'to need'—is inextricably linked to such notions as 'satisfaction', 'feeling of
delight', 'feeling of pleasure'. They all imply a feeling of delight or pleasure
connected with the (conception of the) existence of the object aimed at,
wanted, needed, etc. This means that if 'feeling' cannot consistently be predi-
cated of reason, then these other concepts cannot either. So, for instance, the
often-used concept of reason's 'satisfaction''8 is just as problematic, taken
literally, as that of reason's 'feeling'. Thus, a literal interpretation of Kant's
conative characterization of reason which takes it at face value encounters
severe conceptual difficulties.
Now Kant appears to confirm this assessment himself by explicitly denying
16Most strikingly: WhDo VIII, 136, 137, 139. Sec also KrV A 768/6796; Rcl VI, 58; MdS VI,
378; VvT VIII, 400.
'?Cf, also KpV V, 75; MdS VI, aian.
"Cf. KrV, A 673/8 701; A 676/8704; Prol IV, 332 and 349; KpV V, I4a; WhDo VIII, 136.
THE C O N A T I V E C H A R A C T E R OF R E A S O N IN K A N T 85
that reason feels. In a cryptic footnote in "What Is Orientation in Thinking?"
he states: "Reason does not feel; it sees its lack, and produces through the drive
for knowledge [Erkennlnistrieb] the feeling of a need. Here, matters are as with
moral feeling, which . . . is caused or produced through moral laws, therefore,
by reason" (WhDo VIII , i^gn.). Kant here suggests that there is indeed a
feeling of a need, but that it is not felt by reason, but caused by it. The analogy
with the feeling of respect that Kant draws here suggests that one should read
"needs of reason" as meaning "needs caused by reason" rather than as "needs
on the part of reason." The subject experiencing the need would on this
account be the human subject as a whole, through the interplay of its mental
powers.'9 According to this reading, "need of reason" should be taken as an
elliptical literal formulation. In order to distinguish it from the first, face-
value, literal interpretation, I call this the "genetic" literal interpretation.
This attempt at clarifying the concept of a need of reason is unsatisfactory,
however, for it leaves two problems unresolved. First, it remains unclear how
exactly the genesis of this need should be conceived. Kant says reason "sees its
lack, and produces through the drive for knowledge the feeling of a need. "What
the role of the "drive for knowledge" is, and whether or not that drive inheres
in reason, are important questions that he fails to answer; introducing this
drive seems to alter the problem, not solve it.80 What is clear is only that the
feeling of a need somehow stems from an effect of the faculty of knowledge
on feeling.
If, as Kant suggests, the genesis of this need is to be interpreted as analo-
gous to the genesis of moral feeling, then one would expect him to develop a
counterpart to his account of the dynamic that causes moral feeling (KpV V,
yzff.), in order to conceptualize how exactly this "need of reason "comes about
'^According to Kant, there are also other feelings originating in the interplay of mental
faculties, rather than in physical sensation. These include, e.g., the feeling of pleasure that results
from reflection on purposiveness (in each of its different kinds), and the "aesthetic feeling of life."
For an original discussion of this last notion, see Rudolf A. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation
in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the "Critique of judgment" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990), ch. 5, pp. 88-107. In these cases, as in the case of moral feeling, Kant ascribes the feelings
to the human subject, not to reason.
"There is one other passage in which Kant discusses the genesis of a need of reason, and it
has the same problems. In a footnote in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant states that the needs
of speculative reason spring from reflection on "antecedent necessary problems" (KpV V, I42n.).
As an example, he mentions the idea of God: reason finds this idea in itself as an unavoidable but
problematic concept that it wants to define more precisely. Unfortunately, he again leaves the
exact structure of this process of reflection unexplained. He says that the concept of a necessary
being "lies under the eyes of reason," and that "this concept. . . now wants to be defined." He
speaks further of a "drive for expansion" (Trieb zur Erweiterung) that is supposed to play a crucial
role in the emergence of the need of reason (KpV V, I42n.), but this drive, again, never gets
discussed.
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in the human subject. Such an account would seem necessary, since if the
striving and the needs do not inhere in reason itself, it is logically possible to
conceive of a finite rational being that (i) has a rational idea of a systematic
totality, (2) realizes that its current knowledge is not systematically complete,
i.e., is not fully adequate to the idea, yet (3) does not care about filling up the
difference. Such a being would not perceive the gap between the idea and the
current state of affairs as a gap in need of closing. There is an important
difference between perceiving that one's current knowledge is not systemati-
cally complete and desiring that it should be complete. Only an independently
present desire for complete systematicity can bridge the two and explain how
reason's idea of systematic totality comes to produce a need in humans. Thus,
if reason causes the feeling of a need in humans, it should be possible to
explain which anthropological characteristics lead to this particular effect un-
der the influence of reason. To come back to the parallel case of moral feel-
ing: Kant's account of the genesis of the feeling of respect for the moral law is
in terms of anthropological factors. He shows what effect the representation
of the moral law has on human beings, given their self-love and self-conceit (cf.
KpV V, 7iff.). But nowhere does Kant discuss the anthropological structures
that would account for the genesis of the feeling of the "need of reason" in a
manner parallel to his discussion of the feeling of respect.81
A second difficulty with reading "needs of reason" as "needs caused by
reason" and treating them as needs of human beings rather than needs of
reason as such is that this reading would undermine these very arguments by
mixing in anthropological peculiarities in what is intended to be a theory of
rationality. The problem is the following. Kant argues that it is (subjectively)
necessary for reason to use the regulative idea of God and to postulate the
immortality of the soul and the existence of God. Only in this way can reason
supposedly satisfy its essential needs. But if these needs are not conceived as
needs of, but caused by reason, this undercuts Kant's argument. The problem is
that whatever anthropological factors Kant might mention to explain the gene-
sis of the feeling of need, he would no longer be able to claim, as he does with
regard to the need of pure practical reason, that this need can be ascribed to
every finite rational being in the world (KpV V, 144^). This claim can be main-
tained only as long as the need of reason is explained purely in terms of
structures of (finite) rationality. If, on the contrary, Kant were to have recourse
to anthropological premises, he would have to give up the claim that this need
•'If the "drive for knowledge," mentioned in the footnote discussed above, is taken as pan of
an explanation of how the desire for complete systematicity comes about, this leads to the problem
discussed as the second difficulty.
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can be ascribed to all finite rational beings as such." And although some
readers today might not consider this a serious problem, for Kant it is an
important matter of philosophical rigor.
In sum, we can say that Kant, in spite of his occasional awareness of the
difficulties involved in saying that reason feels needs, does not solve them.
Taking the terms at face value is impossible, but the analogy with moral
feeling does not present a simple solution to the problems. Moreover, when
one attempts to work out this supposed analogy, the genetic conception of the
"need of reason" runs counter to Kant's own critical program and its execu-
tion (at least as far as his moral philosophy is concerned), in that it hinges on
anthropological claims.
4. TWO TYPES OF M E T A P H O R I C A L I N T E R P R E T A T I O N
It might seem that the difficulties connected with a literal reading can be
avoided if one supposes that the conative character of reason is meant to be
taken metaphorically. Kant's attempts, in the footnotes discussed above, to
explain the term 'need of reason' genetically seem to imply that he was inter-
ested in a literal meaning of the term. But given the many unclarities remain-
ing in his account, it is worth exploring the possibility of a metaphorical
reading.
On a metaphorical reading the complaints about inconsistencies in the last
section would miss the point. If one tries to indicate the size of one's house by
saying "My house is a castle," it would be beside the point for someone else to
object that the house does not have any defensive fortifications. Similarly—so
the argument could go—one misses Kant's point if one takes terms such as
'need' and 'satisfaction' literally. Although there have been several commenta-
tors who refer to Kant's expressions as metaphors,2' little has been done to
explicate the presuppositions and implications of this claim. A great deal
depends on what one means by 'metaphor' and how one regards its cognitive
status. Therefore, I first distinguish the different directions in which the
metaphorical interpretation could be taken, and then discuss each of these.
As far as I can see, the claim can be formulated in two versions of differing
"This is why the deflationary reading of the "needs of reason" proposed by Susan Neiman
does not fully capture the interpretative complexities involved. Neiman claims that "there is
nothing mysterious about the notion [of needs of reason] at all" and that "the needs of reason are
just those universal needs which human beings have in addition to those we share with other
animals" (The Unity of Reason, 165, 166). The simplicity and sobriety of Neiman's interpretation
are certainly attractive. However, it leaves the genesis of these needs mysterious, and since
Neiman seems to interpret them in anthropological terms, this interpretation does not account
for Kant's claim that all finite rational beings have these needs.
"3See above, note 3.
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scope. First, one could interpret Kant's language of needs, interests, and satis-
faction of reason as merely decorative, illustrative metaphors with no argu-
mentative force or function of their own. The metaphors could then be
viewed as rhetorical devices, in contrast to the true philosophical content to be
found in literal formulations. This I call the weak claim. This view is very much
in keeping with a view of the role of metaphor in philosophy that has tradition-
ally been predominant, namely, of metaphor as lacking cognitive value, as
having only a decorative, didactic, or rhetorical function, and as being replace-
able by an exhaustive literal paraphrase."*
A second and stronger version of the metaphor thesis could be the view that
it is not possible to formulate a nonmetaphorical version of Kant's justifications
of the regulative ideas and the practical postulates, but that his account is
fundamentally metaphorical. Yirmiyahu Yovel is one of the people who has
most clearly recognized the importance of Kant's conative characterization of
reason, and he probably comes closest to defending the strong view when he
says that we are here dealing with a "metaphor in the deeper sense."25 But
what this entails—both in terms of its meaning and of its philosophical
significance—remains unclear in his discussion. I would like to suggest that
the vague term "deep" can be taken in two ways: either as referring to a root
metaphor, a term I use here for a metaphor which underlies and shapes philo-
sophical thought, or as a metaphor that functions within a body of philosophical
thought and has philosophical import, without being replaceable by an exhaus-
tive literal paraphrase.
I shall first show here that Kant himself distinguishes between different
forms of legitimate use of metaphors in philosophical prose, and that his
distinctions run roughly parallel to the distinction between the weak thesis and
the second version of the strong thesis. As is to be expected, Kant does not
conceive of a legitimate place for root metaphors in philosophy. I then exam-
ine the prospects of each of these for yielding an interpretation of the conative
character of reason.
5. EXCURSUS: KANT ON THE USE OF METAPHOR IN PHILOSOPHY
Kant is not opposed to the use of figurative speech in philosophical prose. On
the basis of his scattered remarks, one can distinguish at least three legitimate
functions of metaphorical language, only two of which are relevant here. Kant
ascribes to it a didactic use and says that when conceptual thinking is not yet
*4 Mark Johnson, "Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition" in Philosophical
Perspectives on Metaphor, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980,4-
20. For an extensive account of meaning and metaphor, see Eva Kittay, Metaphor (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987).
*5Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, i6n.
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fully developed, images can serve as vehicles to help get an idea across.26 This
is irrelevant here, because it is not a potential candidate to explain Kant's
description of reason's nature, since the Critiques are written for a philosophi-
cally competent audience.
The first legitimate use of metaphors that is important in the context of the
present discussion is ornamental. According to Kant, metaphors can illustrate
or decorate philosophical argumentation and thereby play an enlivening role,
without, however, adding anything essential to the argument. He argues,
however, that it should not lead to a blurring of the distinction between
philosophical argumentation and poetic illustration. Both Kant's insistence on
the distinction between poetic and philosophic language and his own employ-
ment of metaphors come together strikingly in the following passage from his
Herder review:
But just as little do we here wish to consider whether that poetic spirit which enlivens
[Herder's] expression has not also at times intruded into his philosophy; . . . whether,
instead of neighborly transitions from the region of philosophic language to that of
poetic language, the limits and possessions of both are not at times completely dis-
placed; and whether the fabric of bold metaphors, poetic images, and mythological
allusions does not rather serve in many instances to conceal the body of thoughts as
under a farthingale, instead of making it agreeably shimmer through as if through a
translucent garment. (RezH VIII , 60, cf. VvT VIII, 405)
Kant's illustrative and decorative use of metaphors in the Critiques is well
known.2" His talk of the "birth-certificate" of the categories, for example, is
clearly metaphorical in this sense (KrV A 86/B 119). The question is whether
talk of the "needs," "interests," and "strivings" of reason can be regarded as all
being of this kind, which would make it fit the weak interpretation.
Second, in certain cases, indirect, figurative language has an essential and
indispensable function within philosophical discourse. Kant's thoughts on this
topic require some explanation.*8
In §59 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes between three kinds
of concepts, and mentions the three corresponding ways in which concepts
can be "exhibited" (dargestellt).1^ These are three ways in which concepts can
rf Accordingly, Kant holds that at the beginning of the history of philosophy figurative speech
was still the only language of philosophy: Logic, IX, 28.
»7See, e.g., David W. Tarbet, "The Fabric of Metaphor in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,"
journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968): 257-70.
B8For a range of interpretations, see A. T. Nuyen, "The Kantian Theory of Metaphor,"
Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (1989): 95-109; Eve Stoddard, "Reason on Trial: Legal Metaphors in
the Critique of Pure Reason' Philosophy and Literature 12 (1988): 245-60; Tarbet, "The Fabric of
Metaphor."
*9Aspects of his argument can also be found in several other passages. Cf. Prol IV, 357-360;
Rel VI, 64-6sn.; ApH VII, 191-92.
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be related to (possible) experience in order to show that a given concept is not
empty, but that an object in reality does or can correspond to it, and thus that
the concept has meaning (Bedeutung), or, as Kant says, objective reality. In the
case of empirical concepts, one can give an example; in the case of pure
concepts of the understanding, one can give a schema (direct exhibition).
Ideas of reason, however, cannot be exhibited adequately by sensible intu-
itions. Unlike empirical concepts, their reality cannot be demonstrated by an
example, and unlike the categories of the understanding, their reality cannot
be shown by a schema. No sensible intuition can ever be fully adequate to an
idea of reason and thereby establish a direct connection of the idea with
experience. Here, says Kant, only exhibition by means of a symbol is possible.
Kant's use of the term 'symbol' is very different from the usual meaning of
the term as a 'conventional sign'.3° Kant defines symbolism as the "transfer
[Ubertragung] of our reflection on an object of intuition to an entirely different
concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond" (KU V,
352f.). Symbolic exhibition is based on analogy (KU V, 352).3' As an example,
Kant mentions that an organism (beseelter Korper) can be a symbol for a constitu-
tional monarchy and that a machine, e.g., a handmill, can be a symbol for an
absolute monarchy (KU V, 352). The symbolic relation does not turn on a
similarity between the symbolizing object of intuition and the symbolized con-
cept. An absolute monarch does not literally grind up his subjects, and there is
no direct, observable similarity between an organism and a constitutional mon-
archy. Rather, as Kant says in the Prolegomena, an analogy "does not signify an
imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of two relations
between entirely dissimilar things" (Prol IV, 357). Thus, as the parts of an
organism relate to the organism as a whole, so the members of a constitutional
monarchy relate to the whole political system. In both cases, Kant assumes,
one thinks of a whole in which each member is not merely a means, but also an
end, and in which the whole and the parts mutually determine each other.
And thus the first can symbolize the second (cf. KU V, 375).
Kant distinguishes the use of analogy in mathematics from its use in phi-
losophy. In mathematics an analogy is a rule which states "the equality of two
quantitative relations" (KrV A lyg/B 222), of the form A:B::C:D, which
makes it possible to know D with certainty when A, B, and C are given. By
contrast, in philosophy an analogy is the equality of two qualitative relations,
3°Kant explicitly rejects such an interpretation himself, KU V, 352.
3' On the issue of symbolism in the third Critique, see Rudolf Makkreel, Imagination and
Interpretation in Kant, 111-29; ^au' Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press: 1979), 374-76; Félicitas Munzel, " 'The Beautiful Is the Symbol of the Morally
Good': Kant's Philosophical Basis of Proof for the Idea of the Morally-Good, " Journal of the History
of Philosophy 33 (1995): 301-30.
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and consequently, Kant says, if three elements are given, one can determine
the relation to a fourth, but one cannot determine this fourth element itself. If
the analogy stays within the empirical realm, it gives one a rule as to how to
search the fourth element, but Kant also uses analogies in cases where the
fourth element is noumenal, and then they give a rule as to how to think it (cf.
KrV A i8o/B 222f.). Kant gives the following example:
By means of such an analogy, I can obtain a relational concept of things which are
absolutely unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of the welfare of children (=
A) is to the love of parents (= B), so the welfare of the human species {= C) is to that
unknown in God (= *), which we call love; not as if it had the least similarity to any
human inclination, but because we can posit its relation to the world to be similar to
that which things of the world bear to one another. (Prol IV,
The relation A:B is what is being transferred to C:D.
What is important here is that Kant argues that for ideas of reason only
such an indirect, analogous manner of exhibition is possible. In §59 of the
third Critique Kant applies this to the idea of God and argues that the only way
one can represent God is symbolically (without, of course, adding anything to
our theoretical knowledge; KU V, 353). Elsewhere, he calls this "symbolic
anthropomorphism" (Prol IV, 357f.; cf. KrV, A 700/8728). It is very impor-
tant to Kant to distinguish this from anthropomorphism simpliciter, which
involves the claim that there are real similarities between God and humans.
Against this view, Kant repeatedly argues that qualitative analogies do not
yield theoretical knowledge of God, but that they provide a way — and the only
way — to show the meaningfulness of the idea of God.s2 This, he says, is
especially important for moral purposes. Here, symbolism enters philosophi-
cal prose in a manner that is both irreplaceable and unavoidable.
One could justifiably call a Kantian symbol a kind of metaphor. After all,
Aristotle regarded analogy as one of the possible bases of metaphorical lan-
guage. 33 Thus, Kant can be said to allow for an important and irreplaceable
use of metaphor within philosophy, of the kind necessary for the second
version of the strong metaphor thesis to even be possible.
For the sake of conceptual clarity, it should be noted that the term 'meta-
3s Kant does speak of "symbolic cognition" (Erkenntnis] of God, but he makes clear that he
does not mean this as determinate theoretical knowledge but as a determination of the idea of
God from a practical point of view. "If one may already call a mere way of representing cognition
(which is surely permissible if it is a principle not of the theoretical determination of the object, as
to what it is in itself, but of the practical determination of what the idea of the object should
become for us and for its purposive employment), then all our cognition of God is merely
symbolic" (KU V, 353). Rudolf Makkreel has clarified the distinction between Erkenntnis and
Wiistn at work here, in his "Regulative and Reflective Uses of Purposiveness in Kant," The
Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1991) Supplement: 49-63. esp. 59.
as Aristotle, Poetics, Ch. 21, I457b.
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phor' is wider than Kant's notion of a 'symbol', for it also includes aesthetic
ideas.34 An aesthetic idea is a product of the free play of the imagination.
Whereas an idea of reason is a concept for which no adequate intuition can be
given, an aesthetic idea is an "intuition (of the imagination) for which an
adequate concept can never be found" (KU V, 342). Although an aesthetic
idea possesses conceptualizable content and "prompts much thought," this
content can never be exhaustively articulated (KU V, 315).
Aesthetic ideas can be used to exhibit rational ideas. For example, a poet
expresses in terms of sense "rational ideas of invisible beings, the realm of the
blessed, hell, eternity, creation, and so on" (KU V, 314). A poet may make use
of analogies, but they are not essential to aesthetic ideas in the way they are to
symbols, since the artist also follows "principles that lie higher up in reason"
which provide freedom from the law of association (KU V, 314). Genius,
which produces aesthetic ideas, is free from the constraint of rules (KU V,
307), whereas symbols are produced exactly on the basis of rules, namely,
rules of analogy and rules of reflection. Thus, the manner in which aesthetic
ideas present rational ideas is different from that of symbols, although neither
kind of exhibition can be fully adequate to the rational idea since, as we saw
earlier, such adequacy is impossible. Aesthetic ideas "expand" it and "cause so
much thought as can never be brought together in a determinate concept"
(KU V, 314). Symbols, on the other hand, are established according to rules,
and give us a guiding principle as to how to think the fourth term (A:B::C:D),
without being able to determine it.
A final difference between symbols and aesthetic ideas, and one that is
especially important in the context of this essay, is that Kant does not seem to
attribute to aesthetic ideas an indispensable role within philosophy. The power
of aesthetic ideas shows itself "properly speaking in the art of the poet" (KU
§49, V, 314). That does not amount to a ban on their use in philosophy, and in
fact, aesthetic ideas can enliven philosophical discourse. A philosophical au-
thor can make a "neighborly transition" in the sense of the quote from the
Herder review, a transition into the poet's realm for the sake of making one's
prose more spirited. But, in such cases, aesthetic ideas have only an "indirect"
relation to cognition, namely, insofar as they "enliven" (belebtn) the cognitive
powers (KU §47, V, 317). They are not strictly necessary for the sake of
philosophical argument as such.
The inexhaustability of content of aesthetic ideas is the reason why they
" For an insightful discussion of the concept of aesthetic idea in Kant, and its relation to
judgments of beauty and judgments of the sublime, see Kirk Pillow, "Form and Content in Kant's
Aesthetics: Locating Beauty and the Sublime in the Work of ATI," Journal of the History oJPhiloso-
/>A>32 ('994>: 443-59-
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are often called metaphors,S5 since inexhaustibility is widely regarded as the
hallmark of metaphoricity. For purposes of the present discussion, however,
this means that the term 'metaphor' becomes too unspecific to use when only
'symbol' is meant, because both aesthetic ideas and symbols are forms of
metaphor. In the discussions that follow I adopt Kant's terminology so as to
make clear which of the different kinds of metaphor is meant when necessary.
6. JUST A D E C O R A T I V E M E T A P H O R ?
I now turn to the question of how the conative characterization of reason is
best interpreted. Consider first the possibility that the talk of reason's needs
and striving is merely metaphorical. The term 'metaphor' is here used in a loose
and unspecific sense, and the emphasis is on 'merely'. The idea is that the
problematic expressions are rhetorical embellishments of literal truths. For
this interpretation to work, it should be possible to give a literal alternative. If
one cannot formulate an appropriate literal counterpart, i.e., if the conative
talk cannot be substituted, it becomes impossible to view these terms as merely
decorative.36
Thus, although we have already seen some reason to doubt that there is a
literal claim to be made, I would like to consider in some more detail the very
possibility of formulating a literal justification of the use of the regulative idea
and the two practical postulates at issue, without any recourse to needs, feel-
ings, strivings, etc., of reason, i.e., without any traces of conative terms. I shall
argue that this is impossible.
In support of the "merely decorative" interpretation, one might claim that
the "need" of using regulative ideas is not interestingly different from the
rational necessity or "need" to draw the conclusion Q from the premises P —»
Q and P. When we say we "need to conclude that Q," the term 'need' is not
used as a decorative metaphor to enliven our prose, but it is a conventional,
literal way of speaking. This particular way of using the term 'need', someone
might argue, may have inspired Kant to play on the connotations of this term
for rhetorical purposes.
The problem with this argument is that it depends on an equivocation of
different kinds of necessity, and, consequently, of different ways in which the
term 'need' is used. In the example given, what is at issue is logical necessity,
ark Johnson, "Introduction," 14.
s^Thus, it is possible to decide whether the conative talk is merely decorative without entering
the intricacies of the philosophical debate about the nature of metaphor. Furthermore, I here
leave aside the debate about the literal-figurative d is t inc t ion as such. I am concerned with the
question of the status of the conauve character of reason within Kant's philosophy, and since he
takes this distinction for granted, the attempt to interpret his talk about reason does not require a
resolution of this issue.
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not the subjective necessity Kant speaks of when he appeals to the conative
nature of reason. One can see the difference more clearly when one substi-
tutes 'interest' for 'need'. In logic, it is inappropriate to say that the justifica-
tion for believing that Q lies in the fact that we have an interest in believing so.
Similarly, in one sense we indeed "need" to hold that every event has a cause.
This is not the kind of need that is invoked by Kant's conative characterization
of reason, however, but a matter of objective necessity. According to Kant, we
do not have a choice as to whether or not to employ the principle, and conse-
quently he does not justify this synthetic a priori principle by an appeal to
strivings, interests, or needs.
Furthermore, phrases such as "the nature of reason" or "the constitution
of our faculties of knowledge" do not provide satisfactory candidates for a
literal counterpart to Kant's conative talk in sentences like "Reason's interest
makes it necessary to assume t h a t . . . " They are not specific enough. As soon
as one tries to spell out exactly what it is about this nature or constitution that
justifies the regulative ideas and the postulates at issue, the talk of strivings
and needs enters the account.
A construction of a literal version should be able to give an account of the
insufficiency of logical and objective grounds and highlight the decisive role
of the moment of subjectivity. In each of the cases I mentioned as examples in
the second section of this essay, Kant's argument is based on the premise that,
when objective grounds do not suffice to decide a matter that is of vital
interest to reason, subjective grounds can tip the scale. In each of these cases,
logical and objective grounds are insufficient and so, Kant says, reason is
justified in letting its own interest be decisive. I do not know how to talk about
subjective grounds except in terms of desires, needs, interests, and the like.37
And as long as we cannot formulate an account of subjectivity that avoids all
conative terms, we cannot conclude that Kant's conative characterization is
just metaphorical in the sense of a merely decorative, inessential illustration.
7. REASON AND SYMBOLISM
There are still two options left for an interpretation of the conative character-
ization of reason: as a root metaphor or as a symbol. To say it has to be
37 In an attempt to circumvent the conative terms, John Zammito renders Btdurfniszs 'require-
ment'. However, in discussing this requirement, he speaks of a 'propensity' of reason, a term
which seems to have no advantage over 'needs' or 'interests' {see Zammilo, The Genesis of Kant's
"Critique of Judgment," 238). Similarly, paraphrasing the justification of the regulative ideas or
postulates by saying thai they are necessary to fill a 'gap' that would otherwise exist presupposes
the antecedent desire or need for closure. Cf. Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 95. One has to have
recourse to concepts such as those of a 'need', 'striving1, or 'interest' of reason to explain why the
gap is perceived as a gap to be closed.
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understood as a root metaphor, one which underlies the Kantian project,
would constitute the more radical claim. It would imply that figurative speech
had made its way into the heart of Kant's philosophy, without being able to be
accounted for in Kantian terms. It would be a move from the attempt at
understanding the text as a philosophical argument to its explanation in exter-
nal terms. That is no reason to reject this possibility, of course, since it may
turn out that this is our only option. But from the perspective of what would
constitute the hermeneutically optimal solution, we should first try and see if
the concept of symbolism can help us out, and only shift from interpretation
to explanation if that fails.
The question, then, is whether the symbolic reading provides a possible
interpretation. The notions of analogy and symbolism can be found through-
out Kant's work, but he does not apply them to reason itself. Thus, the ques-
tion is whether he could have explained consistently his way of speaking along
these lines. More specifically, the question is whether it is possible to read
terms such as the 'need' or 'interest' of reason as cases of the ineluctably indi-
rect, symbolic exhibition of the kind Kant mentions with regard to the idea of
God. If so, this affirms the second, strong reading of Kant's conative character-
ization of reason, according to which it is a form of irreduceably metaphorical
language that functions within philosophical thought.
There are three reasons for an affirmative answer. First, since symbolism
can be used in many different contexts, there is nothing in the notion of
symbolism that would preclude its application to reason. Second, the concept
of reason is of the kind that cannot be exhibited except by means of a symbol.
Reason itself cannot be exhibited by an example or a schema. No sensible
intuition can be adequate to it. There is an unsurpassable limit to its possible
self-understanding, insofar as it is impossible for reason to obtain objective
theoretical knowledge of the ground of its own subjectivity.38 In this regard
reason itself shares the fate of the ideas, which Kant claims can be exhibited
only symbolically. Thus, for it, too, in its reflexive critical undertakings, the
recourse to indirect, symbolic exhibition is arguably necessary. Third, as a
matter of fact, Kant treats organisms as the symbol of reason.39 Although he
does not reflect on its methodological and ontological status, Kant points out a
similarity between how the parts (members, organs) of an organism are re-
lated to each other and how the principles of knowledge are related to each
other. In the Critique of Pure Reason, for example, he says that pure speculative
3*See Henrich, "On the Unity of Subjectivity," in which he discusses Kant's talk of a "com-
mon, but to us unknown root" in which sensibility and understanding "perhaps" find their
common ground (The Unity of Reason, 17- 54). Cf. K r V A 15/B 29.
»The importance of Kant's analogy between reason and organisms has been recognized by
several authors, e.g., Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's "Critique of Judgment,71 173-75.
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reason forms a unity "in which every member, as in an organized body, exists
for the sake of all the others, and all for the sake of each" (KrV B xxiii; cf. B
xxxvii f.).
The analogy between organisms and reason, applied to the problem of the
conative characterization of reason, would imply that the relation between
reason, on the one hand, and regulative principles and postulates, on the
other, should be regarded as analogous to the relation between organisms and
that which fulfills their needs. Symbolizing reason in this way would not imply
any observable similarity between organisms and reason. Rather, it involves an
analogy: An organism (A) is to the object of its needs (B) as reason (C) is to the
regulative ideas or postulates (D).
Given that reasoning by analogy plays an important role in Kant's philoso-
phy, given that 'reason' itself fits the category of supersensible concepts for
which exhibition through analogy is necessary, and given that Kant states that
there are analogies between organisms and reason, it is possible to interpret
the conative talk as unavoidably symbolic in the Kantian sense. In this way,
Kant's talk of the needs, striving, and satisfaction of reason can be seen to be
neither "just" a decorative metaphor, nor a literal-denotative ascription of
properties, but can be understood as based on analogy.4°
Thus, it is not necessary to explain the conative characterization of reason
as a root metaphor. The symbolic reading is a possible way of reconstructing,
or perhaps more accurately of developing the methodological foundation of
Kant's characterizations of reason. Although it involves working out an argu-
ment Kant failed to develop, his philosophical work provides the conceptual
space for doing so.
8. CONCLUSION
Kant does not himself clarify the meaning of the conative description of
reason in a satisfactory manner. He describes reason in terms of needs, inter-
ests, and a striving for satisfaction without himself solving the philosophical
quandary connected with these descriptions. The explorations in this essay
show both the importance of his characterization of reason as conative anrfthe
conceptual quagmire hidden beneath the surface of this characterization.
I have not here aimed at an evaluation of Kant's characterization of reason
as conative. I have explored the relative merits and disadvantages of four ways
*°This interpretation can be reconciled with Kant's footnote discussed in the third section
above. On this view, reason can indeed be said to produce the feeling of a need in humans,
provided one realizes thai this production itself cannot be the object of theoretical knowledge and
has to be thought symbolically. The problems mentioned in section three arise only if one takes
this production as the object of possible determinate theoretical knowledge. I thank Rudolf
Makkreel for pointing this out to me.
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of making sense of Kant's language. It is impossible to tell with certainty
whether one of these four represents his considered view, and indeed, he may
not actually have had an articulate view on the matter at all. His characteriza-
tion of reason, when taken at face value, is hard to make consistent with his
distinction between reason and feeling. The genetic interpretation seems to
run counter to Kant's program of a critique of reason, not anthropology.
Attempts to explain this talk as just a decorative metaphor, however, fail to
yield a more satisfactory interpretation, because of the impossibility of specify-
ing the subjective moment in other, unproblematic terms. Interpreting the
conative characterizations of reason's nature as "symbolic" in Kant's own sense
is possible and enables us to make sense of it in his own terms.
This result also highlights an essential aspect of Kant's theory of reason in
general. Kant's use of symbolism for reason is different from other uses (e.g.,
with regard to God) in one respect, namely, in that it shows (and results from)
the reflexive character of Kant's philosophy. This symbolism functions in the
critical self-explication of reason, where reason is not given to itself as an
object, but nevertheless needs to present itself to itself in the process of gain-
ing clarity about its own workings. Kant's use of symbolism for reason also
shows his critical restraint with regard to substantive claims about reason and
his denial of the possibility of theoretical knowledge of it. Reason is not given
to consciousness, and thus our account of it must at least in part be con-
structed. 4' All of this is obscured if one regards Kant's conative characteriza-
tion of reason as merely decorative, as an elliptical way of making an anthropo-
logical statement, or as simply inconsistent.4"
Washington University
«'Cf. Onora O'Neill: "He denies not only that we have access to transcendent metaphysical
truths, such as the claims of rational theology, but also that reason has intrinsic or transcendent
vindication, or is given to consciousness. . . . Critique of reason is possible only if we think of
critique as recursive and reason as constructed rather than imposed" (Constructions of Reason
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1989], 26-27). O'Neill does not address the question of
the epistemic status of Kant's conative characterization herself, bul l think the account presented
in this essay is compatible with her approach.
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